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5
Motivating Consummate Effort 
David M. Kreps
Stanford University
What is the best way to motivate consummate effort?
By “consummate effort,” I mean effort undertaken by a worker 
within an organization that goes well beyond any nominal job descrip-
tion, in a manner that is desired by the organization, at a job that has 
some if not all of the following characteristics:
• The individual worker must attend to several different tasks and
must allocate her time among them.
• The tasks to be done are, ex ante, ambiguous. What to do next
involves the results of work done so far and the resolution of
environmental uncertainty, in ways that neither the worker nor
her supervisors can anticipate initially.
• The tasks involve creativity by the worker or, at least, thinking
and then acting “outside the box” on occasion.
• Outcomes are hard to describe, let alone measure, in the short
run.
• Insofar as outcomes can be measured, they are the result of the
efforts of multiple workers.
• Cooperation among workers is important to the organization.
• The worker has substantial effective autonomy; the technology
is such that she makes on-the-job choices with little supervision
or even guidance from her supervisors.
For lack of a better term, let me call such jobs Type-K jobs, for 
Knowledge (or Knowledge Worker). Such jobs are particularly preva-
lent in organizations in the so-called new economy. But even in the 
old economy of manufacture, a fi rm that employs high-commitment 
human-resource management (see Baron and Kreps [1999], Chap-
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ter 9) will have workers assigned to jobs with at least some of these 
characteristics. Therefore, the question that leads off this chapter is of 
importance, both to practicing managers who wish to be successful 
and to economists (and other social scientists) who wish to understand 
the practice-performance link in both new-economy organizations and 
organizations that embrace high-commitment human resources (HR).
Unhappily, the dominant economic theory of motivation—incen-
tive theory, a.k.a. agency theory—is of little help. Or, more accurately, 
agency theory is of negative help. Starting from the basic agency-
theory model—i.e., rewards for (apparent) performance that balance 
effort and risk aversion (Grossman and Hart 1983; Holmstrom 1979)—
analyses of job models that incorporate some Type-K characteristics 
generally come to the conclusion that rewards-for-performance will be 
ineffective.1
Let me be clear here: I’m not saying that mainstream economics 
cannot explain how to motivate consummate effort. But, at least as 
formulated in much of the literature, it tells us that, for Type-K jobs, 
schemes based on pay (and other forms of tangible personal rewards) 
for performance as measured by outcomes are diffi cult to get right and, 
if gotten right, expensive for the level of motivation provided.
So, what are the alternatives? Social psychologists propose a num-
ber of motivational channels beyond tangible personal rewards, and 
they offer theories as to how effective these channels are. Inspired by 
their theories, I report some survey data in which successful executives 
are (essentially) asked to give their impressions about what is the best 
way to motivate consummate effort. After a brief recounting of two 
things—1) various psychological theories of motivation and 2) some 
data on human resource management (HRM) practices in high-tech 
start-ups—I compare and contrast how an economist and a social psy-
chologist might explain these data. Many of the perspectives I attribute 
to the psychologist can be incorporated into economics, but one impor-
tant feature of some psychological theories—the notion that, in terms 
an economist would use, employee preferences are malleable—goes 
beyond orthodox economic theory. I close by arguing that this impor-
tant feature of real-life motivation of consummate effort should become 
part of economic orthodoxy.
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SOME MOTIVATING SURVEY DATA
The ideal research strategy to address the opening question of this 
chapter, on how to motivate consummate effort, is (probably) to con-
duct controlled fi eld experiments. But organizations are rarely willing 
to allow social scientists to experiment in a controlled fashion with the 
motivational channels the organizations employ.2 So, bearing in mind 
the many defi ciencies of retrospective survey research, we can instead 
ask successful managers how effective (in their view) are some possible 
alternatives.
Each summer for the past 15 years or so, I’ve surveyed the par-
ticipants of the Stanford Executive Program (SEP) on this matter. The 
SEP is a six-week general-management program, typically bringing to 
Stanford between 120 and 160 top-level executives.3 The summer of 
2013 was fairly typical: of 158 participants, 124 responded to my sur-
vey. Table 5.1 gives some demographics volunteered by the 124 respon-
dents, but here are some quick summary statistics: The participants are 
from around the world, with 20 to 30 percent each from three areas: 
1) the United States and Canada, 2) Europe, and 3) East and South Asia. 
The median age is around 45. Most (85 percent) are men. About half 
hold ranks in their home institutions of chair or chief executive offi -
cer, chief operating offi cer, or head of a staff function; the rest are less 
senior (but, we infer, are rising in their organizations, since their orga-
nizations paid the exorbitant fees that Stanford charges participants).4 
Functionally, half consider themselves to be general managers, with the 
rest in a variety of specialized functions (only 2.4 percent are in HRM). 
And they come from a variety of different industries.
The survey has several parts, but the part of immediate interest 
begins with the following prologue: “The next fi ve questions concern 
what motivates ‘best work’ or ‘consummate effort’ in your organization 
back home. To be clear, by ‘best work’ or ‘consummate effort,’ I mean 
effort that goes above and beyond the nominal specs of the job. I’m 
interested both in what motivates you and in what motivates your direct 
reports, and in this part of the survey, I am interested in the following 
sorts of motivators:
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United States/Canada 31 25.0
Latin America 10 8.1
Europe 37 29.8
East or South Asia 27 21.8
Africa/Middle East 4 3.2
Australia/New Zealand/Pacifi c Islands 15 12.1
Age
Less than 40 18 14.5
40 to 44 45 36.3
45 to 49 35 28.2





Chair/CEO/managing partner/president 25 20.2
COO 11 8.9
Head of a staff function: CFO/CPO/CIO/etc. 26 21.0
Senior VP/senior partner 14 11.3
VP/partner 23 18.5
General manager 25 20.2
Functional fi eld





Information technology 5 4.0
Human resource management 3 2.4
Strategic planning 8 6.5
Other 18 14.5
Industry
Financial services/investments 17 13.7
IT/Electronics/computer technology 27 21.8
Manufacturing/construction 24 19.4
Health care/pharma/biotech 2 1.6
Marketing/retail 12 9.7
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• a direct connection between providing consummate effort and 
tangible rewards for the individual, such as higher pay, better 
promotion prospects, higher status, and so forth
• work that is personally interesting and exciting
• a direct connection between providing consummate effort and 
success for the organization (or work group)
• work that contributes to society, transcending both the personal 
interests and rewards of the individual doing the work and the 
well-being of associates and the organization for which the indi-
vidual works.
Then, concerning these four motivational channels, I ask four 
questions:
 1)  How effective are each of the four motivational channels in 
motivating the best work of the people that report to you? The 
survey provides respondents with a fi ve-point scale on which 
to respond: “Not at all effective”; “Of limited effectiveness”; 
“Effective, but not very effective”; “Very effective”; and 
“Only this is effective for eliciting best work.”
 2) Which of the following statements is most descriptive of what 
motivates the best work of your direct reports? 
• They do their best work when they perceive a direct 
connection between providing consummate effort and 
personal rewards for them.
•  They do their best work when the work is personally 
interesting and exciting. 
•  They do their best work when they see a direct connec-
tion between their consummate effort and success for 
the organization. 
•  They do their best work when their work contributes to 
society, transcending . . . both the personal interests and 
rewards of the individual doing the work and the well-
being of associates and the organization for which the 
individual works. 
 3) This question is the same as Question 1 but asked in terms of 
motivating the respondent’s own best work.
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 4) The fi nal question reprises Question 2 but, as in Question 3, in 
the context of motivating the respondent’s own best work.
Of course, we have no guarantee that the jobs of either the SEP 
participants or those who report directly to them are Type-K jobs. But 
because the participants are generally members of upper management 
in their organizations, as are their direct reports, I believe it is safe to 
assume that most of the jobs have some if not all of the characteristics 
of a Type-K job. Be that as it may, the responses collected are shown 
in Table 5.2. Note that the upper half of the table contains the answers 
given to Questions 1 and 2—that is, answers concerning the respon-
dents’ perceptions of their direct reports. It also gives mean scores for 
answers to the fi rst question, averaging over all responses, where “Not 
at all effective” = 1, “Of limited effectiveness” = 2, and so on. And, in 
similar format, the bottom half gives the responses for Questions 3 and 
4—i.e., for the respondent’s own sense of what motivates him or her.
There is a lot going on in these data (some of which concerns cor-
relations in responses, which I’ll get to in a bit), but here are a few 
(relevant) highlights:
• The economic theory of incentives is best represented by the tan-
gible rewards responses, and while tangible rewards as a motiva-
tional device are perceived as having some power, they are cer-
tainly not the be-all and end-all of motivational channels: over 
40 percent of respondents say that when it comes to motivating 
their direct reports or themselves, tangible rewards are less than 
“very effective.” Moreover, tangible rewards as motivator are 
“most descriptive” (of the four channels) around 20 percent of 
the time for the direct reports and 10 percent of the time for “own 
motivation.”
• In contrast, for direct reports, exciting work as a motivator is per-
ceived as being at least “very effective” by nearly 80 percent of 
the respondents; for the respondents themselves, exciting work 
is at least “very effective” for nearly 85 percent. And exciting 
work wins as “most descriptive” in both halves of the survey.
• Motivation by success of the organization is perceived to be 
especially effective for the respondents themselves, being “very 
effective” or better in 90 percent of the cases.
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Table 5.2  Responses to the Survey on Motivation by SEP Participants, 2013
What motivates best work by the people who report directly to you?
(n = 124)






















Tangible rewards 0.8 8.9 32.3 54.0 4.0 3.52 21.1
Exciting work 0.0 1.6 9.7 78.2 10.5 3.98 40.7
Success of organization 0.0 3.2 30.6 53.2 12.9 3.76 24.4
Work is socially important 4.8 38.7 33.1 21.8 1.6 2.77 13.8
And what motivates your own best work?
(n = 120, 121)






















Tangible rewards 0.8 12.5 28.3 55.0 3.3 3.48 10.8
Exciting work 0.0 0.0 5.8 79.3 14.9 4.09 33.3
Success of organization 0.0 0.8 9.2 63.3 26.7 4.16 32.5
Work is socially important 1.7 18.3 38.3 36.7 5.0 3.25 23.3
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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• Motivation by socially important work is seen by many respon-
dents as being less effective in both halves of the survey than 
the other three motivational channels. However, nearly a quar-
ter of the respondents saw socially important work as being 
“most descriptive” of what motivates them—more than double 
the number who saw tangible rewards as the most descriptive 
self-motivator.
• One expects that perceptions of what motivates oneself would be 
“nobler” than perceptions of what motivates others. We see some 
of this in the data: organizational success and socially important 
work are perceived as being more effective on self than on direct 
reports.5,6
• One might attribute this difference in perceptions to differences 
in rank in the organization: The more senior “self,” being higher 
in the organization and, presumably, older and wealthier, is bet-
ter able to afford being motivated by the work, or by success 
of the organization, or by doing something regarded as socially 
important. If this is true, it should (presumably) show up in how 
the mean scores for self-motivation change as we move across 
the various demographic characteristics of the respondent. That 
is, chief executive offi cers (CEOs) or chairs should be less 
self-motivated (on average) by tangible rewards than are those 
respondents who identify as general manager. See Table 5.3; the 
data on mean scores don’t support this explanation, although the 
“most descriptive” data do, especially for the category of moti-
vation by organizational success.
• There could also be some selection bias at work: the respondents 
chose to spend six weeks away from their homes, families, and 
jobs to take courses at Stanford University. While Stanford is 
a very nice place to spend six weeks in the summer and par-
ticipants are treated extraordinarily well in terms of creature 
comforts, the cost of this program—both the dollar cost and the 
personal cost to the participant of being away from home and 
work for six weeks—is substantial. The participants, by choos-
ing to attend the program despite its costs, are clearly indicating 
“unusual” aspects of their characters and preferences, which is 
(of course) the hallmark of sample selection bias.
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• But, in line with the results of Heath (1999) (in which the selec-
tion bias explanation cannot be applied), I conjecture that these 
differences in the top and bottom halves of Table 5.2 refl ect a 
misperception of what motivates either others or oneself or both. 
In fact, my prejudices (and they are just prejudices) are that there 
is misperception on both sides: the participants are somewhat 
“fl attering” themselves as being more organizational- and social-
minded than they really are, while they are being too harsh in 
this respect on their direct reports.
• More generally, we can wonder whether any of the demographic 
characteristics have a discernible impact on either the average 
scores or the percentages of the most effective channel, for self 
or for direct reports. See Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for the numbers; 
make of them what you will.7
• In due course, I’ll explain why, but for now let me stipulate that 
it is interesting to look at the correlations in how respondents 
answered Questions 1 and 3 and how they responded to Questions 
2 and 4. For Question 1 versus Question 3, the correlation matrix 
is given in Table 5.5, Panel A. We see that the strength of motiva-
tor X on direct reports (as perceived by a respondent) is strongly 
correlated with the strength of X on self in all cases of X, while 
the mixed correlations (X on direct reports versus Y on self for 
X ≠ Y) are much less positive—and are, in many cases, negative. 
Panels B and C report on the internal correlations of answers to 
Question 1 and Question 3.
As for Questions 2 and 4, we can look, say, at the conditional fre-
quency that X is most descriptive as the best motivator for self, given 
that it is most descriptive for direct reports, and compare this to the 
marginal frequencies. We get the following:
• For “Tangible rewards,” the conditional frequency is 25 percent, 
versus 11 percent on the margin.
• For “Exciting work,” the conditional frequency is 45 percent, 
versus 33 percent for the entire population. For “Success of orga-
nization,” the conditional frequency is 62 percent, versus 33 per-
cent overall.
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Table 5.3  Cross-Tabulations of Mean Score for the Motivators and Percentages of “Most Descriptive” Motivator 
for Self against Demographic Characteristics 


















United States/Canada 27 3.67 4.94 3.96 3.00 18.5 33.3 25.9 22.2
Latin America 9 3.44 4.33 4.44 3.56 11.1 22.2 33.3 33.3
Europe 35 3.26 4.03 4.17 3.29 2.9 31.4 37.1 28.6
East or South Asia 24 3.46 4.13 4.33 3.50 12.5 33.3 25.0 29.2
Australia/New Zealand/Pacifi c Islands 14 3.57 4.07 4.00 2.93 14.3 28.6 42.9 14.3
Less than 40 years old 17 3.47 4.06 4.18 3.34 0.0 47.1 41.2 11.8
40 to 44 years old 39 3.72 4.21 4.03 3.00 15.4 38.5 35.9 10.3
45 to 49 years old 33 3.36 4.03 4.12 3.55 15.2 21.2 24.2 39.4
50 and older 24 3.21 4.00 4.38 3.21 4.2 25.0 33.3 37.5
Male 98 3.49 4.07 4.14 3.21 10.2 33.7 33.7 22.4
Female 15 3.33 4.20 4.20 3.53 13.3 20.0 26.7 40.0
Chair/CEO/managing partner/president 23 3.35 4.13 4.26 3.43 4.3 21.7 47.8 26.1
COO 11 3.45 4.09 4.18 3.36 0.0 45.5 45.5 9.1
Head of a staff function: CFO/CPO/
CIO/etc.
25 3.28 4.08 4.16 3.36 0.0 40.0 28.0 32.0
Senior VP/senior partner 13 3.54 4.08 4.00 3.15 30.8 15.4 23.1 30.8
VP/partner 19 3.89 3.95 4.05 3.16 15.8 36.8 31.6 15.8
General manager 22 3.41 4.18 4.18 3.05 18.2 31.8 22.7 27.3
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General management 50 3.42 4.20 4.22 3.32 8.0 26.0 44.0 22.0
Finance 14 3.36 4.14 4.07 3.00 14.3 57.1 21.4 7.1
Marketing 7 3.29 4.14 4.00 3.29 14.3 28.6 14.3 42.9
Operations/production/manufacturing 9 3.78 3.78 4.00 2.78 11.1 55.6 22.2 11.1
Strategic planning 8 3.50 4.00 3.75 3.50 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Other 16 3.69 3.88 4.25 3.06 12.5 31.3 31.3 25.0
Financial services/investments 16 3.75 4.44 4.38 3.19 0.0 50.0 37.5 12.5
IT/electronics/computer technology 24 3.42 3.96 4.08 3.42 16.7 12.5 25.0 45.8
Manufacturing/construction 22 3.50 4.14 4.14 2.86 13.6 36.4 22.7 27.3
Marketing/retail 12 3.58 4.00 4.17 3.58 16.7 8.3 58.3 16.7
Public sector 6 3.00 4.17 4.17 3.33 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3
Other 28 3.46 4.00 4.11 3.25 10.7 42.9 32.1 14.3
NOTE: Only those characteristics for which there are six or more respondents are given. Please note carefully: the demographic charac-
teristics are those of the respondent and not (necessarily) his or her direct reports.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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Table 5.4  Cross-Tabulations of Mean Score for the Motivators and Percentages of “Most Descriptive” Motivator 
for Direct Reports against Demographic Characteristics 


















United States/Canada 31 3.68 3.97 3.61 2.61 25.8 38.7 22.6 12.9
Latin America 11 3.73 4.27 3.91 3.00 10.0 50.0 20.0 20.0
Europe 38 3.39 3.89 3.76 2.58 10.5 39.5 36.8 13.2
East or South Asia 27 3.63 3.96 4.04 3.04 33.3 25.9 22.2 18.5
Australia/New Zealand/Pacifi c Islands 16 3.00 4.00 3.63 2.94 12.5 62.5 18.8 6.3
Less than 40 years old 18 3.50 3.83 3.72 2.56 16.7 55.6 22.2 5.6
40 to 44 years old 47 3.57 4.06 3.79 2.57 23.9 41.3 28.3 6.5
45 to 49 years old 35 3.40 3.91 3.66 3.11 20.0 31.4 25.7 22.9
50 and older 27 3.56 3.96 3.89 2.81 22.2 37.0 22.2 18.5
Male 108 3.52 3.94 3.79 2.71 23.1 39.8 25.9 11.1
Female 19 3.47 4.11 3.63 3.11 11.1 38.9 22.2 27.8
Chair/CEO/managing partner/president 25 3.48 4.04 3.76 2.76 16.0 40.0 24.0 20.0
COO 11 3.36 3.91 4.18 2.73 18.2 36.4 45.5 0.0
Head of a staff function: CFO/CPO/
CIO/etc.
28 3.32 3.96 3.75 2.89 21.4 46.4 21.4 10.7
Senior VP/senior partner 14 3.50 4.07 3.71 2.79 21.4 42.9 14.3 21.4
VP/partner 24 3.71 4.00 3.67 2.54 25.0 45.8 16.7 12.5
General manager 25 3.64 3.84 3.72 2.88 25.0 25.0 37.5 12.5
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NOTE: Only those characteristics for which there are six or more respondents are given. Please note carefully: the demographic charac-
teristics are those of the respondent and not (necessarily) his or her direct reports.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
General management 55 3.53 4.02 3.80 2.69 18.5 38.9 27.8 14.8
Finance 16 3.56 3.88 3.56 2.56 31.3 50.0 18.8 0.0
Marketing 9 3.11 4.00 3.89 3.33 22.2 33.3 22.2 22.2
Operations/production/manufacturing 10 3.90 3.80 4.00 2.60 30.0 30.0 20.0 20.0
Strategic planning 8 3.50 3.88 3.25 3.00 25.0 50.0 0.0 25.0
Other 19 3.53 3.95 3.89 2.63 26.3 36.8 31.6 5.3
Financial services/investments 17 3.71 3.82 3.65 2.65 29.4 29.4 29.4 11.8
IT/electronics/computer technology 27 3.41 4.04 3.63 2.78 30.8 38.5 11.5 19.2
Manufacturing/construction 25 3.44 4.08 3.88 2.52 12.0 48.0 32.0 8.0
Marketing/retail 12 3.75 4.00 4.08 3.00 25.0 16.7 33.3 25.0
Public sector 6 2.83 4.00 3.67 3.17 33.3 33.3 0.0 33.3
Other 33 3.67 3.85 3.73 2.73 18.2 48.5 27.3 6.1
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Table 5.5  Correlations in Effectiveness of Different Channels on Direct 
Reports versus Self (Panel A), on Self versus Self (Panel B), 
and on Direct Reports versus Direct Reports (Panel C)













Tangible rewards 0.515 0.153 0.001 −0.118
Exciting work −0.055 0.379 0.074 0.063
Success of 
organization
−0.100 −0.102 0.437 0.103
Work is socially 
important
−0.354 −0.057 −0.030 0.594










Tangible rewards 0.007 −0.038 −0.300




Panel C: Correlations of score for direct-report motivation versus direct-report 
motivation










Tangible rewards −0.076 −0.083 −0.362
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• For “Social importance,” while only 23 percent of the respon-
dents said it was most descriptive of the best way to motivate 
themselves, a whopping 88 percent of those who said it was most 
descriptive of the best way to motivate their direct reports said 
the same for themselves.
There are some other interesting “descriptive statistics” buried in 
the data from this survey, but this is enough: I’m not going to claim 
that this is a scientifi cally conducted survey (but I will point out that 
the respondents took the survey long, long before they heard from me 
on any of these topics). But having run similar surveys on the SEP par-
ticipants in previous summers, I’m confi dent that the main results (not 
those reported in Note 7) replicate themselves, at least for SEP partici-
pants. And I strongly hypothesize that they will be replicated for other 
groups of senior executives.8
I reiterate that retrospective survey data of this sort—in particu-
lar survey data on what respondents believe motivates them and their 
direct reports—should be taken with a large grain of salt. But in what 
follows, I take these descriptive statistics at face value and ask: What is 
driving them? And, since this is meant to be an essay in economics, how 
do we explain them (if at all) using economics?
Colleagues who are social psychologists have no problem explain-
ing these data. Their explanations derive from various theories they 
have about motivation in general, theories that are generally unfamil-
iar to economists. So before giving their possible explanations of these 
data, and comparing those explanations to what an orthodox economist 
might say, I fi rst briefl y describe some of the psychological accounts of 
motivation, with special attention given to one of these, self-perception 
theory. Then I describe some further data gathered by colleagues of 
mine concerning the HR practices (and subsequent economic outcomes) 
of high-tech start-ups in Silicon Valley. And then I have these data dis-
cussed by a fi ctional economist and a fi ctional social psychologist.
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A FAST TOUR OF SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS 
OF MOTIVATION
Economists like to show how things that seem different are really 
the same. Psychologists like to show how things that seem the same are 
really different. —Dale Miller (professor, Stanford Graduate School of 
Business), in discussion with the author, 2014
Economics—or, at least, mainstream economics—is based on one 
model of human behavior: utility maximization. Hence, the dominant 
account in mainstream economics of motivation is incentive theory. The 
theory may be applied to a diverse array of (modeled) circumstances— 
to jobs where relative-performance evaluation is possible, or where the 
agent must attend to several tasks—but the basic model of behavior 
stays the same.
Psychologists—and, in particular, social psychologists who are 
concerned with work settings—have a number of distinct accounts of 
on-the-job motivation, based on what drives behavior. Some accounts 
involve conscious analysis and choice by the worker; others appeal 
more to subconscious and unconscious behaviors. My specifi c interest 
is in one particular account, called self-perception theory. But here is a 
quick tour of some of the other accounts:9
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory presents a conscious-cognition model of how 
people decide what to do or how hard to work.
• The employee has expectations about whether effort or specifi c 
actions on her part will lead to the results that (she perceives) 
management wants. This is called expectancy.
• She has expectations concerning whether fulfi lling what is per-
ceived as management’s desires will lead to rewards for herself. 
This is instrumentality.
• She attaches value to the rewards she thinks she may get. This is 
called valence.
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The actions she will take are, roughly, those that maximize her 
chances of receiving the rewards that she values the most. Some formu-
lations of this hypothesis try to make this prediction exact, by taking the 
product of the two probabilities times a measure of value of the prize. 
But we don’t need anything so rigid. We simply note that, everything 
else being equal, she will take action A instead of B if she believes that 
A is more likely to lead to what she perceives as management’s desires; 
she will take action C over D if she believes that the likely outcome of 
C is more likely to be rewarded; and she will take action E over F if the 
rewards associated with E are more valuable to her.
This is a theory about employee expectations.10 Accordingly, the 
managerial implications of this theory begin with clarity:
• Clarity or transparency of what management desires and what 
will be the rewards the employee will receive if she performs 
well enhances instrumentality, hence helps to motivate desired 
behavior.
• While the theory emphasizes expectations, it is something of a 
necessary (but not suffi cient) condition that employees can in fact 
achieve the desired outcomes. Beyond this, employees should 
believe that they are capable of achieving the outcomes manage-
ment desires if they behave as desired, enhancing expectancy.
• The rewards that are on offer should be valued by the employees, 
enhancing valence. Note in this regard that insofar as employees 
engage in social comparisons or otherwise value procedural and 
distributive justice, rewards should be equitably awarded (see 
the subsection “Equity Theory,” further on).
• Insofar as an employee’s conscious expectations drive his or her 
behavior, management should keep close tabs on those expecta-
tions. And management should strive to understand what employ-
ees value, rather than assuming that it is monetary compensation.
Expectancy theory is illustrated by Tracy Kidder’s classic book 
The Soul of a New Machine (Kidder 1981). The young engineers who 
were working on designing a next-generation computer (by designing 
both the hardware and the microcode that would run it) worked long 
hours, because they believed that this is what it would take to get the 
machine ready for market in the time required (expectancy). They were 
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convinced that this was what management wanted. They believed that 
if they succeeded in these terms, they would be allowed to work on 
yet another new machine (instrumentality)—what Kidder calls “pinball 
effects.” And, for reasons that we’ll try to explain later in this chap-
ter, they valued the opportunity to work on a new machine (valence). 
This last part may seem mysterious: the story essentially is that they 
are willing to work incredibly hard for the opportunity to keep working 
incredibly hard. Why would they value that? It was not for any fi nan-
cial reward that they had been promised. So that is what remains to be 
explained.
Goal-Setting Theory
Goal-setting theory is a version of expectancy theory in which the 
reward is achievement of some artifi cial goal: Management sets for the 
employees a goal to achieve, and, if certain conditions are met, achiev-
ing the goal is, for the employees, its own reward.
The acronym SMART as a modifi er of the goals describes some of 
the conditions that should be met if goal setting is to be effective: The 
goal should be Specifi c (not vague), Measurable (you know when you 
get there and, along the way, you know when you are making progress 
toward the goal), Achievable (you should be able to get there), Rel-
evant (the goal should “make sense” as something that is important 
to achieve), and Time-bound (the time it will take to achieve the goal 
should be relatively clear; “you’ll get there eventually” is not SMART).
In addition, goals should be somewhat challenging; if the employee 
is to feel a sense of satisfaction from achieving the goal, it can’t be 
something that requires little or no effort. (But, it can’t be so challeng-
ing that the individual doubts that she can achieve it.) And, at least in 
some accounts, the goal should be viewed as legitimate (which may be 
subsumed under Relevant); it may enhance perceptions of legitimacy to 
have the employee participate in the setting of her goals.
The notion that achieving a goal that has been set provides its own 
satisfaction seems quite reasonable to me, at least based on my own 
behavior (which, I hasten to add, is a terrible way to validate psycholog-
ical theories; be assured that the proponents of this theory have backed 
it up with a lot of careful empirical work). But I have some issues with 
this theory when it comes to Type-K jobs. These issues are, roughly, 
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related to the multitasking issues that arise in the economic theory of 
incentives: When the employee’s job involves several distinct tasks, 
how does one set a goal that encompasses all the tasks? Presumably, 
you set goals related to each task, but does that then cause the indi-
vidual to allocate her time so as to increase her chances of meeting them 
all? And is that necessarily what the organization desires? Goal-setting 
theory (I’m told by colleagues) has been criticized along precisely these 
lines (although I haven’t consumed the relevant literature yet). So my 
bottom line on goal setting is that I believe it can be a good, even pow-
erful motivational tool if you can meet the requirements of SMART, 
plus challenge and legitimacy. But in some jobs and for some employ-
ees—for Type-K jobs, in particular—this isn’t going to be easy.
Equity Theory
Equity theory posits that employees are demotivated by inequitable 
distributions of rewards. Very roughly speaking, each employee looks 
at the ratio of the rewards received by herself and her fellow workers to 
her perception of how much she and they have contributed to the orga-
nization, and she is demotivated when those ratios are quite different 
from each other. In operationalizing this, “rewards” is broadly defi ned; 
we include not only fi nancial compensation, but things like praise and 
recognition. And the hypothesized demotivation is meant to occur at 
both ends of the spectrum: someone who receives too much reward in 
proportion to her contributions feels shame or embarrassment and is 
demotivated, while someone who receives too little feels anger. In fact, 
according to this theory, someone whose ratio is in the middle will be 
demotivated, if she sees peer A with a much higher ratio than peer B.11
Variations on this basic theme involve
• a distinction between distributional and procedural equity—
the fi rst concerns the rewards actually received by the different 
employees, while the second concerns whether the process that 
determines rewards is judged to be fair, even if it sometimes pro-
duces results that seem skewed;
• social comparisons, where individuals in comparing the ratios 
for various employees tend to confi ne their attention to those 
who are socially similar to themselves;12
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• the confounding effects of social distinctions: partners in, say, 
a law fi rm may be disproportionately rewarded relative to legal 
associates, but this may be “okay” if legal associates view their 
current efforts as moving them up to the ranks of partnership.
If you buy this theory, the obvious managerial implication is to 
engage in equitable rewards. But this is not always easy to do, because 
it is the perception by individuals of these ratios that is important in the 
theory, and perceptions of different employees about who is making 
what level of contribution do not always agree.
Reinforcement Theory
In comparison with expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, and 
equity theory, reinforcement theory involves (perhaps!) less conscious 
forms of behavior. The term operant conditioning is used; behavior of 
a certain sort triggers a change in one’s “conditions.” If the change is a 
net positive, the form of behavior is strengthened; if the change is a net 
negative, the behavior is weakened.
• Positive reinforcement is where a valued behavior is rewarded, 
strengthening the behavior; e.g., if a rat pushes the appropriate 
lever, it gets food. So it “learns” to push the lever.
• In negative reinforcement, a desired behavior causes a nega-
tive condition to stop or lessen, also strengthening the behavior. 
Example: a rat is subjected to mild electrical shocks, which cease 
for a while if it pushes a lever. So it learns to push the lever.
• Punishment is where an undesirable behavior leads to a nega-
tive condition (the punishment), which lessens the undesirable 
behavior. Example: When a rat pushes a lever, it receives a 
shock. It learns not to push the lever.
• Extinction is where a (formerly desirable and now undesirable) 
behavior that previously was rewarded is no longer rewarded, 
lessening the behavior. Example: The rat in the positive rein-
forcement story suddenly fi nds that pushing the food lever no 
longer results in food. So it learns that it is no longer worthwhile 
to push the lever.
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Note the parenthetical “(perhaps!)” in the fi rst sentence of this sec-
tion; I don’t know enough about the intelligence of rats to know whether 
a conscious connection is made, or whether the rat is just conditioned 
to push the lever.
Applied to employees, presumably the odds are higher that a con-
scious connection is made; my (perhaps uneducated) understanding is 
that the basic theory is agnostic as to whether the learned behavior is 
learned (or unlearned) through conscious reasoning or a less conscious 
process.
To be effective, reinforcement rewards (or punishments, or cessa-
tion of negative conditions) should be clearly connected to the behav-
ior being strengthened or weakened. This means, for one thing, that 
the “rewards” should be temporally contiguous with the behavior—in 
employment settings, shorter review-and-reward periods would be bet-
ter. Some accounts hold that, for job-related applications, the key to 
positive reinforcement is transparency—i.e., more information about 
what’s expected and what’s rewarded. This suggests that applications to 
on-the-job motivation are probably more of the conscious variety.
Self-Determination Theory
In the theories explored so far, motivation is tied to external stimu-
lus of some sort or other: In expectancy theory, behavior is consciously 
undertaken to fulfi ll what is perceived by the employee to be the orga-
nization’s desires, leading (one hopes) to a valued reward. Goal-setting 
theory, at least in employment contexts, seems to be rooted in the idea 
that a goal is set externally (although I imagine the theory works in 
similar fashion for self-set goals). In equity theory, rewards are deter-
mined by an external authority. In reinforcement theory, good behavior 
is rewarded and bad behavior punished by an external party.
Self-determination theory concerns motivation that, in contrast, 
is intrinsic to the individual. The individual acts in a particular way 
because she wants to do so, even absent external rewards or stimulus. 
In particular, the theory holds that the more an individual is likely to be 
self-motivated (hence perform better?), the greater are
• her ability to act with autonomy—the ability to control her own 
actions;
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•  her ability to gain and exhibit competence—to control the out-
come and exhibit (if only to herself) her mastery of the situation; 
and
• her ability to be socially related to others—to interact with, be 
connected to, and to help others and be helped in turn.13
Essentially, the managerial implications are that, to enhance per-
formance through intrinsic motivation, one should increase employee 
autonomy, give employees greater opportunities to enhance their skills 
and demonstrate competence with those skills, and increase a sense of 
“belonging” and “helping” others.
Given the problems in incentive systems that fi t under the rubric of 
multitasking (and other problems in getting externally applied incen-
tives “right”), intrinsic motivation might seem like a silver bullet (i.e., a 
simple and seemingly magical solution to a complicated problem) when 
it can be enlisted: the employee does the right thing, all by herself.
Of course, it isn’t that simple, which explains the parenthetical 
“(hence perform better?)” in the second paragraph of this section. An 
employee who is intrinsically motivated is motivated to do those things 
for which she has a lot of intrinsic motivation—that’s a tautology—
which may or may not be the things that the organization desires her to 
do. If the employee’s intrinsic motivation aligns with what the organi-
zation wants, it can be the proverbial silver bullet mentioned a moment 
ago. But that’s a mighty big if. If employees come intrinsically moti-
vated to do what the organization desires, great. But, in other cases, a 
key to enlisting intrinsic motivation is to fi nd ways and means to get 
the employee’s intrinsically motivated behavior aligned with what the 
organization values. Which takes us to my favorite among the psycho-
logical accounts I discuss:
Self-Perception Theory
Self-perception theory (Bem 1972) has a very different account of 
behavior from the usual utility maximization of economics; it is based 
on a process of retrospective justifi cation leading to future behavior. 
The basic notion is that individuals sometimes (often?) act without hav-
ing clearly defi ned objectives; after the action is taken, the individual 
looks for a “story” that explains why she acted as she did, and the story 
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she adopts affects her future behavior. If, for example, she justifi es her 
efforts with the story that the work she did serves some social goal and 
that she cares about achieving that goal, then, in the future, her behav-
ior will refl ect enhanced care for that social goal.14
Consider the young engineers in The Soul of a New Machine. At 
fi rst, perhaps, working long and onerous hours was no big deal; per-
haps they were carried along by enthusiasm for a new project. But as 
they continued to work under exhausting and stressful conditions, they 
looked for a reason: How could they rationalize to themselves why they 
were doing this? They weren’t going to be paid a big bonus if they suc-
ceeded, so that wasn’t it. At least as Kidder tells the story, they didn’t 
have a lot of affection for the fi rm for which they worked (although they 
did have affection for each other and for the leadership of their group). 
No particular social purpose was served by what they were doing. But a 
story that did scan for them is, they were working those onerous hours 
because the work itself was fun, interesting, and exciting. And, if they 
perceived that this was what had motivated them in the past, it becomes 
a piece of their “identity”; they perceive that the work is fun, hence they 
desire to continue to have the opportunity to do it. This fi lls in the miss-
ing piece of the expectancy-theory story of their behavior.
Employees in some cases will have a choice of how they rationalize 
their past behavior; depending on their choice, we get different values, 
hence different future behavior. Salience of a particular “story” makes it 
more likely to be the chosen rationale; hence, to the extent that manage-
ment wishes to employ self-perception theory to its own ends, it should 
determine which story is the one it wants employees to embrace, and it 
should set conditions to make that story the most salient.
Primary Nursing at Beth Israel Hospital
An anecdotal example illustrates how this process is meant to work, 
as well as problems it can cause. In the 1970s, Beth Israel Hospital in 
Boston embraced the then-new practice of primary nursing.15 In primary 
nursing, each admitted patient (referred to here as “he”) is assigned a 
primary nurse (a senior registered nurse [RN], referred to here as “she”) 
from the fl oor or ward in which the patient will stay. Each nurse given 
such duties is, at any point in time, assigned as primary nurse for a small 
handful of patients—three would be a typical number. A patient’s pri-
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mary nurse is responsible for coordinating all care for the patient. When 
the patient is admitted, he meets with his assigned primary nurse, who 
takes the full history of the patient. When she is on duty, she performs 
most routine nursing duties for “her” patients. When off duty, she is still 
on call for her patients. She works closely with the admitting doctor and 
other docs and staff who might be providing services to the patient, but 
she is “in charge” (of course, in consultation with the admitting doc and 
attending specialists for decisions that require the approval of a physi-
cian); it is her name and not that of the doc that is on the patient’s bed. 
If a patient is readmitted to Beth Israel, every effort is made to assign 
to him the RN who was his primary nurse during his earlier stay. The 
culture strongly encourages her to make a personal connection with her 
patients and, indeed, to think of them as “hers.”
Nursing is, of course, a Type-K job.16 Primary nursing, by encour-
aging a personal connection between a patient and his primary nurse, 
leads the nurse to internalize strongly the welfare of her patients, which 
in turn leads her to go above and beyond her normal duties in giving 
and securing the best possible care (in a caring manner) for them. The 
practice worked like a charm: Beth Israel gained a reputation in Boston 
as being the best hospital at which to be a patient because of the extraor-
dinary level of care it provided; among RNs, it gained a reputation as 
the best hospital at which to work. A psychologist could appeal to self-
determination theory to explain this outcome: primary nursing scores 
well in providing the RN with autonomy, by giving her opportunities 
to exhibit competence and to be socially related. And a psychologist 
could appeal to self-perception theory: over time, an RN, for whom 
primary nursing means hard work, attributes her efforts as “I really do 
care about the welfare of my patients,” which, going forward, lessens 
the cost and increases the personal benefi t she perceives in going above 
and beyond the normal effort and hours.
This story has a less-than-happy ending.17 Because a patient’s pri-
mary nurse was motivated fi rst and foremost to help her patients, she 
directed care for them based on her perception of what was best for 
them. In the fee-for-service fi nancial environment of the 1970s, this was 
not a major problem. But as insurance companies moved from fee-for-
service to diagnosis-resource-group and capitation-based reimburse-
ment schemes, Beth Israel, now called (following a merger with Dea-
coness Hospital) Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BIDMC), faced 
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considerable fi nancial pressure to cut costs. Primary nurses were asked 
to make “fi nancially sensible” decisions about services provided to their 
patients; BIDMC considered schemes that would take this decision-
making authority out of the hands of the RNs altogether or, at least, 
would make it a shared authority of all nurses on a fl oor or ward. The 
patient load placed on the primary nurses was increased; the ability of a 
primary nurse to make a personal connection with each of “her” patients 
was weakened. One can imagine that, given the culture of nursing that 
had built up over decades of primary nursing, this was far from easy.
The Undermining Effect: Does Extrinsic Motivation Drive Out 
Intrinsic Motivation?
A well-established meme within psychological theories of moti-
vation is that the imposition of extrinsic motivation can dull intrinsic 
motivation, to such an extent that valuable intrinsic motivation virtually 
disappears. A typically cited manifestation of this concerns blood dona-
tions: historically, donating blood has been done for no particular com-
pensation, except (perhaps) the ability to draw on the blood bank, if a 
donor fi nds himself in need at some later date. At one point in England, 
blood banks, seeking to increase donations, decided to offer a small 
monetary payment for a donation, the idea being that people would be 
more likely to give blood if some extrinsic motivation was loaded on 
top of whatever intrinsic motivation caused people to give blood pre-
viously. But instead, blood donation rates decreased. Making a small 
payment for donations caused something adverse to happen to whatever 
was motivating folks to give blood previously.
Both self-determination and self-perception theory give accounts 
that can explain this. Taking self-determination theory fi rst, it might be 
that autonomy is perceived as having been reduced, insofar as potential 
donors feel that the fi nancial reward is an attempt to control their behav-
ior. The sense of social relatedness may be reduced. Before the extrinsic 
payment was offered, donating one’s blood was a very social act; now it 
seems more of a market exchange, motivated by a desire for payment. 
And the sense that blood donation achieves something important and 
valued is, at least, shifted, on much the same grounds.
As for self-perception theory, loading on extrinsic rewards in a set-
ting where individuals come with signifi cant intrinsic motivation gives 
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the individual a number of “stories” to explain why she acted as she 
did. Before, perhaps she rationalized her behavior by attributing it to the 
enjoyment she takes from the task, or because she values the success 
of the organization and is willing to sacrifi ce her self-interest to some 
extent to help the organization succeed, or because she perceived that 
her efforts were helping to achieve some greater goal. Now, competing 
with her previously held self-perception is the story that she did it for 
the reward. Indeed, when the extrinsic reward is added, its novelty may 
enhance its salience. Hence her self-perceived reason for acting as she 
did changes, and now (perhaps) she strives to maximize her extrinsic 
rewards, and the silver bullet of intrinsic motivation is minimized. In 
a word, the extrinsic rewards undermine the intrinsic motivation she 
might have had; hence, this is called the undermining effect.18
A variation on undermining concerns the impact of extrinsic rewards 
on intrinsic motivation when the extrinsic rewards are removed. To give 
an example, many readers will know of work done by Roland Fryer and 
associates concerning the motivation of inner-city schoolchildren to 
achieve more in their studies; see, for instance, Fryer (2011). Much of 
the attention in this work has been on what a psychologist would think 
of as enhancing expectancy: rewards for grades worked less well in 
improving grades than did rewards for reading books, because the stu-
dents were unclear on what to do to improve their grades. But also from 
a psychologist’s perspective, Fryer’s work raises questions about what 
will happen when the experiment ends. While his fi nancial rewards for, 
say, reading books have worked in the short run, should we be con-
cerned that the learned behavior by students is that you read for the 
fi nancial rewards and not for pleasure or knowledge?
Attribution Theory and the Sad Tale of Company Z
Self-perception theory is a subset of attribution theory. In the basic 
account of attribution theory, Person X observes Person Y taking some 
action A. Person X then tries to answer the question for herself: why 
did Y do A? She tries, in other words, to attribute Y’s action to some 
underlying motive M. And, having attributed the behavior to M, her 
expectations about future actions by Y are that Y will continue to act in 
ways that serve motive M. Self-perception theory, then, is attribution 
theory for the special case of X = Y.19
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When X is distinct from Y, X’s attributions about Y’s motives can be 
extended to third parties, especially third parties who are, in X’s view, 
similar to Y.20 But, at least in some accounts, X’s attributions about Y 
can affect X’s self-perception.
The sad tale of Company Z illustrates this.21 Company Z is a reason-
ably young company (on the order of fi ve years old) that was founded 
to accomplish a “mission”: to change the face of Industry I. Industry I 
provides services to various companies, but it does so in particularly 
opaque fashion: most clients of Industry I are in the dark when they 
shop for the services that fi rms in Industry I offer; they don’t know 
where to fi nd the best quality-to-price ratios for specifi c services that 
they require.
Company Z’s mission is to change this by bringing transparency to 
Industry I. The fi rm hired both professionals who understand the intri-
cacies of Industry I and professionals who design web-based informa-
tion systems, and set for these two groups the task of designing acces-
sible web-based tools that would allow the clients of Industry I to shop 
intelligently and knowledgeably.
Company Z paid these professionals submarket wages, giving them 
no stock options or other forms of incentive pay. And this all took place 
in a local labor economy where the professionals employed by Com-
pany Z had lots of outside opportunities. Nonetheless, Company Z got 
from its employees consummate effort, with minimal turnover. The rea-
son: Company Z stressed the “mission” it was on, and it hired profes-
sionals who bought into this mission. “Changing the face of Industry 
I” became the strong motivator of these employees, a motivator that 
(according to self-perception theory) grew even stronger, as the profes-
sionals in Company Z could only justify their efforts with the attribu-
tion “I’m doing this because the mission is important to me.” And the 
fact that employees of Company Z were surrounded by and interacted 
with peers, all of whom seemed to be acting for the same reason, further 
strengthened this effect.
Recently, Company Z has developed its product and, after some 
testing with a few lead clients, is seeking to sell the product broadly. 
This takes salespersons, and the leadership at Company Z decided that 
the mission demanded the best sales force they could fi nd. The choice 
of company leaders was not salespersons who bought into the mission, 
but salespersons with proven track records of success in sales of related 
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products. Salespersons come from a professional culture whose mem-
bers expect incentive pay in the form of commissions on sales made, 
with the further expectation of making a lot of money if they succeed. 
Since that is what it takes to get the best salespersons (i.e., those that 
have compiled the most successful track records in the past), that is what 
Company Z offered. The salespersons hired had base salaries higher 
than the salaries other professionals in the fi rm made, with incentive-
pay possibilities that would lead to total compensation far in excess of 
what those other professionals could obtain.
Of course, to be effective, the salespersons had to interact with the 
other professionals, both to learn about Industry I and about how the 
product worked. And when the other professionals learned how much 
the salespersons were making, inevitable social comparisons were 
made, and the other professionals became demotivated. Indeed, the 
company’s HR folks surveyed all employees to gauge satisfaction, and, 
department by department, the closer the staff in a department was to 
the sales staff (in terms of both social categories and frequency of inter-
action), the lower was their self-reported level of satisfaction.
Equity theory provides one simple account of what happened at 
Company Z: the other professionals looked at the ratios of contribu-
tions to compensation and saw blatant (distributive) inequities. But the 
attribution-theory account also provides an explanation: When sur-
rounded by other employees, all of whom were mission-driven, the 
mission was a powerful motivator for each employee. When faced with 
(socially similar) employees who seemed to require personal rewards to 
motivate them, the previously mission-driven employees at Company Z 
began to question their own motivation.
THE STANFORD PROJECT ON EMERGING COMPANIES
A second set of data will fi nish setting the table for the discussion to 
come between the psychologist and economist. These data come from 
the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC).22
SPEC was a project conducted by three colleagues, James Baron, 
Diane Burton, and Michael Hannan. They assembled a sample of 154 
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high-tech start-ups in Silicon Valley and, through a combination of ret-
rospective interviews and available fi nancial data, tried to answer ques-
tions such as “What clusters of human-resource-management (HRM) 
practices are prevalent in these fi rms?” “What is the HRM practice-
performance link?” and “How do changes in HRM practices (as the 
fi rms grow and evolve) affect performance?”
They started, through interviews with the fi rms’ founders, by identi-
fying the founders’ HRM vision. They characterized what they learned 
from the interviews in terms of three questions and a set of answers. 
Then, based on the interviews with the founders, they chose for each 
question the answer that best fi t what they had heard:
 1)  What was (the founder’s vision of) the basis of attachment of 
employees to the fi rm? Was it 
a)  love of the fi rm or coworkers, 
b)  the interesting and exciting work that the employee was 
doing, or 
c)  the money the employee received?
 2)  How were employees selected? Was it 
a) on the basis of cultural fi t, 
b)  based on the possession of skills needed to perform a 
list of immediately required tasks, or 
c) based on the individual’s longer-run potential to 
contribute?
 3) How were employees coordinated or controlled? Was it 
a) by adherence to professional norms of appropriate 
behavior, 
b)  by adherence to a set of organizational norms specifi c to 
the fi rm, 
c)  by adherence to a set of formal rules and procedures, or 
d)  by direct oversight by one’s superior?
This gives 3 × 3 × 4 = 36 different “founding visions” or models for 
the start-ups. The data revealed that nearly 60 percent of the 154 fi rms 
in the sample conformed to one of only fi ve models, with characteristics 
and names (given by the researchers) as shown in Table 5.6. The most 
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popular by far was the Engineering model, accounting for 32.5 percent 
of the fi rms.23 But both the Commitment and Star models appeared fre-
quently: 7.1 percent of the fi rms were Commitment model fi rms; 8.4 
percent were Star model fi rms.
These fi ve “pure types” or models were created in part based on 
the data, but also because they conformed to the researchers’ sense of 
bundles of HRM practices that are internally consistent. Following the 
work of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the term complementary might 
be used, but the complementarity here is at least as much psychological 
as technological: the idea is that employees at a fi rm adhering to one of 
these fi ve types would see the different practices as conforming to com-
mon organizational models; e.g., the Commitment model resembles a 
family, the Star model an academic department at an elite university.
The SPEC research explores a number of questions with this typol-
ogy as a starting point; for instance, it looks at how the initial (or found-
er’s) vision infl uenced the evolution of HRM practices. But two ques-
tions addressed by this research will come into play in the dialogue of 
the next section: 
 1)  What correlations did the research fi nd between the founder’s 
vision and the product strategies of the fi rm? 
 2)  Did the founder’s vision have any effect (on average) on the 
subsequent fi nancial performance of the fi rm?




Attachment Selection Control method
Engineering Work Skills Organizational norms
Commitment Love Fit Organizational norms
Star Work Potential Professional norms
Bureaucracy Work Skills Formal rules
Autocracy Money Skills Direct
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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A PSYCHOLOGIST AND AN ECONOMIST DISCUSS THE 
SURVEY DATA, COMPANY Z, SPEC, AND MORE
We can now listen in as a (fi ctional) psychologist (P) and an (equally 
fi ctional) orthodox economist (E) discuss the survey results and related 
matters. Since (I assume) most readers of this chapter will be econo-
mists, I will have the psychologist use terms that are not typically in 
a psychologist’s standard vocabulary but that “translate” into the lan-
guage spoken by economists.
P: The data from the SEP survey are not in the least bit surprising. Peo-
ple can be motivated in many different ways, so I’m not surprised 
that we see as much variation in the answers as we do. But surely 
these data are surprising to an economist like you. Doesn’t econom-
ics hold that only money (and perhaps power) can motivate people, 
since that is the only thing they value?
E: That’s a bad misreading of what economics says. Economics is based 
on the idea that people act in a way that maximizes their “utility.” 
But many arguments can enter into an individual’s utility function in 
a positive way (that is, with a positive partial derivative), including 
the joy of working on a challenging problem, a desire to see one’s 
team or organization succeed, or the achievement of some goal that 
is socially valuable.
P: I don’t remember those sorts of things in the utility functions in my 
old economics textbooks.
E: It’s true that textbook models tend to emphasize money or, even 
more fundamentally, goods that are literally consumed. But that’s 
just textbook stuff, done to keep the story simple. Utility is a refl ec-
tion of what the individual values, and no one can deny that different 
people value different things. Economists even have a bit of Latin to 
describe the situation: De gustibus non disputandum est (“There is 
no arguing about tastes”).
P: Okay, I’ll accept that. But not everyone values challenging problems 
or success of the organization or contributing to social good, while 
surely almost everyone values more income and other forms of tan-
gible, personal rewards. So why don’t all these high-powered execs 
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see tangible rewards as the best all-purpose way to motivate their 
direct reports?
E: That’s a good question, and the answer is actually provided by the 
economic theory of incentives. If we are talking about Type-K jobs, 
all those characteristics that make for a Type-K job are characteris-
tics that make “pay for performance”–style incentives hard to devise 
and ineffective in practice. If you can fi nd another way to motivate 
workers, a way that avoids some of the problems with pay-for-
performance schemes, that other way may well be superior in terms 
of motivational bang for the buck.
 Let me give you a “for instance.” Two of the characteristics of a 
Type-K job are 1) what economists call multitasking—the need for 
the worker to do several things and to allocate her time among the 
tasks—and 2) outcomes that are hard to measure or can only be mea-
sured in the somewhat distant future. Both of these characteristics 
can be killing to a pay-for-performance incentive scheme.24 Now 
suppose—and it is a strong supposition—the individual worker has 
a good sense of what she should be doing from the perspective of 
the organization at the time that she must take action; that is, she 
knows what sorts of efforts are in the best interests of the organi-
zation, including her allocation of time among different activities. 
An employee who knows these things and who has internalized the 
welfare of the organization—who wants to see the organization suc-
ceed—will do the right thing (more or less) automatically, avoiding 
agency costs, as long as the fi rm doesn’t screw things up by trying 
to load an ill-fi tting rewards-for-results scheme on top. That is, even 
if this worker has a utility function that is much more responsive 
to personal rewards than to doing right by the fi rm, if her personal-
rewards compensation is insensitive to measures of performance, 
she’ll choose to do right by the fi rm. Of course, if the fi rm could fi nd 
a personal-rewards incentive scheme that reinforced doing the right 
thing, that would improve matters. But the latter is hard to do (the 
theory tells us), so why not rely on the “second order” desire to see 
the fi rm succeed?
 And, in this regard, note that there are two keys here: The individual 
must understand how her efforts connect with organizational suc-
cess. And she must value the organization’s success. The fi rst of 
Ch5Kreps.indd   124 11/4/2016   12:49:58 PM
Motivating Consummate Effort   125
these fi ts in well with how the survey phrased things: It asks for the 
relative effi cacy in terms of motivation of establishing a direct con-
nection between providing consummate effort and success for the 
organization. It isn’t just an appeal to the employee to “do right by 
the organization.” Implicitly it is that, but, explicitly, it is about being 
sure that the employee recognizes what that entails.
P:  And the second key? Are we to believe that so many workers have 
internalized in their preferences the success of the organization for 
which they work? From my perspective, I believe that the organiza-
tion can foster such preferences. But my sense is that de gustibus, 
when incanted by an economist, means that the tastes of each indi-
vidual are innate and immutable; economics as a discipline takes 
them as a given. Do so many workers come with these innate prefer-
ences? And, if so, why do all those textbooks ignore what would be 
a powerful and common factor in workers’ utility functions?
E: Well, remember that the population we’re speaking of consists of 
SEP participants and their direct reports. These are all people pretty 
high up on the organizational ladder. Maybe what is going on here is 
that organizations, when deciding whom to promote into high posi-
tions, screen in particular for workers who have a track record of 
doing the right thing for the organization, which would favor people 
who do have the welfare of the organization as a powerful factor in 
their preferences.25
 In this regard, I call your attention to the survey of Stanford MBA 
students, referenced in Note 7. They gave better scores (on average) 
to tangible rewards. They are younger and less senior. If my hypoth-
esis is correct that the organization screens over time for people who 
value the welfare of the organization or interesting work, then as 
people are or are not put in positions of greater authority, you would 
expect that less screening has taken place for MBA students and 
their peers. Hence, on the margin, appealing to the universal desire 
for personal goodies becomes more effective.26
P:  How about this? If the problem in Type-K jobs is that we don’t know 
a priori what the employee should be doing—if we can’t devise a for-
mula a priori that will link outcomes to rewards—then surely, after 
the fact, the boss can ask “What did you do?,” judge whether this 
was what was desired, and provide a monetary reward if what the 
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employee did was judged, ex post, to be “the right thing.” Doesn’t 
that sort of ex post evaluation coupled with tangible rewards get 
around the diffi culties in designing ex ante incentive schemes for 
Type-K jobs?
E: It would, if the boss can meet Conditions A, B, and C: A) discern 
what the employee did do ex post, B) know what the information 
state of the employee was when the employee made work choices, 
and C) credibly commit to rewarding “doing the right thing.” Each 
of those is somewhat problematic, but not entirely unreasonable. In 
a sense, what you are proposing is a scheme of subjective ex post 
evaluation, which has been studied in the economics literature; early 
papers include Prendergast and Topel (1993) and Baker, Gibbons, 
and Murphy (1994). But, as is very well known (and one of the main 
points in Prendergast and Topel), tangible reward schemes that are 
based on subjective ex post evaluation of performance invite what 
economists call infl uence activities and what you probably call argu-
ing or pleading one’s case, instead of getting on with productive 
work. The more a job is Type-K, I believe, the less likely it is that 
Conditions A through C will hold, and the greater will be the cost of 
infl uence activities. 27
P: Let’s talk about Beth Israel Hospital, then. My explanation for the 
problems the hospital faces is that, through the practice of primary 
nursing, supervisors inculcated in their nurses a regard for the wel-
fare of the nurses’ patients as primary. I guess, to use your terminol-
ogy, I would say that Beth Israel increased the importance that that 
factor has in the utility functions of their nurses. Having done so, 
they have found it hard to “redirect” their nurses to balance what is 
ideal for the patient with what it costs the hospital.
E: I’m not keen on this notion that the nurses’ preferences were some-
how changed, but I’d offer a closely related explanation. The hard 
work associated with primary nursing for a nurse is a very effective 
screen. Only RNs who have tremendous innate concern for the well-
being of their patients would put up with phone calls at 3:00 a.m. 
from a patient complaining about something or other. RNs without 
such a strong concern would look for work elsewhere. So, over the 
years, Beth Israel wound up with RNs with that sort of preference, 
and RNs with those sorts of preferences are not going to be very 
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good at the balancing act that is now required. Indeed, since I don’t 
think preferences of an individual are malleable, I think BIDMC 
is in worse shape than do you: They are stuck with a nursing staff 
whose preferences don’t fi t the new economic realities. You, I gather, 
believe that, while it may take time and be painful, BIDMC may be 
able to “remake” its RNs’ preferences to fi t better with what those 
new realities require.
P: I certainly do believe that, although I’m not saying it will be easy. 
But let’s move on. I’m pretty sure I know what you will say, but 
what do you make of the correlations found in the survey answers, 
as reported in Table 5.5 and in the discussion following that table? 
Before you answer, let me tell you how I view them. While I’d be 
happier if some of the negative correlations in the bottom parts of 
the table were even more negative, they fi t quite well with how I see 
things. Take the top part of the table fi rst. I think what we are see-
ing here is a strong organizational fi xed effect. Some organizations 
employ tangible rewards as a motivational device. Others employ 
“love of work.” And so forth. The SPEC data suggest as much, but I 
think that any level of casual empiricism would tell you that differ-
ent organizations in similar situations employ different motivational 
channels. Since each SEP participant and his or her direct reports 
work in the same organization, whatever is viewed as a strong, or 
most descriptive, motivator for the direct reports is more likely to be 
a strong or most descriptive motivator for the respondent. Hence, in 
the top half of the table, strong positive correlations are found down 
the diagonal, and not much correlation or even negative correlation 
is found on all off-diagonals.
E: I agree with you that there is an organizational fi xed effect here, and 
I think the ultimate explanation for it is equilibrium screening. If you 
are the sort of person who gets a lot of juice out of being a “member 
of the team,” you join an organization that rewards behavior that is 
directed at team success. If you love to work on challenging prob-
lems, you join an organization that rewards its employees with chal-
lenge. Of course, this is an equilibrium phenomenon: Organization 
A attracts people who want to be part of a team and work for the 
team’s success, so at Organization A, that becomes the most effec-
tive way to motivate the workforce it gets, which (to complete the 
loop) attracts the type of people who want to be part of a team.
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P:  Just what I expected you to say. I agree that what you call screening 
plays a role, but I’d go further: Once you join, say, your Organiza-
tion A, with everyone around you doing stuff so that the team will 
succeed, your desire to do what is best for the team is enhanced, as 
per the attribution-theory extension of self-perception. Indeed, if the 
company “rewards” your efforts by celebrating the team’s success, 
self-perception theory alone predicts that this motivating factor will 
be strengthened through time.
E: Let me ask you: The most negative off-diagonal entry is motivation 
by social importance for the direct reports, and motivation by tangi-
ble rewards for the respondents. How do your theories explain that?
P: To explain that, I want to look at Panels B and C of the table. Most 
of the correlations here are close to zero, with two exceptions: moti-
vation by tangible rewards has substantial negative correlation with 
socially important work, and motivation by success of the organi-
zation is substantially positively correlated with socially important 
work. I admit, I’d like to have seen the close-to-zero entries be more 
negative. In part, this should have been built in to the way the sur-
vey was worded. The highest category of answer is “Only this is 
effective” for eliciting best work, and we see percentages of around 
10 percent or more selecting this answer, at least for exciting work 
and success of the organization. The plain language of that answer 
should certainly imply that the respondent who picks this answer for 
one of the four motivational channels would give a very low score 
to the other three. But it turns out that this isn’t how the respondents 
responded. I looked at the detailed data and found that the average 
score given to the other three motivational channels by someone 
who gave one of the four an “only this” rating was 3.34, versus an 
average score in the entire sample of 3.50. There is even one respon-
dent who gave two of the four motivational channels an “only this” 
rating and the other two a “very effective.”
 But even without this—that is, even if the top category had been 
called “extremely effective,” so that it was phrased in a way that 
didn’t preclude high scores for the other motivational channels—
I would have liked to see more negative correlations. My theories 
of motivation, and in particular self-perception, suggest that one 
motivational channel will be particularly effective if it is the sole 
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ex post rationalization available as to why individuals give consum-
mate effort, which would then go along with low scores for the other 
channels. So I can’t say that the data are what I’d want to see, ideally.
 That said, I think the correlations in Panels B and C between tan-
gible rewards and socially important work and between success of 
the organization and socially important work are, respectively, an 
extreme case of what I was hoping for and the results of an ambigu-
ously worded survey. To explain: If I had to guess which of the four 
motivational channels are “furthest apart” in terms of basic motiva-
tional forces, I’d guess tangible rewards—the “What’s in it for me?” 
motivation—and socially important work, or “What’s in it for soci-
ety?” So, being strongly motivated by one ought to go with being 
poorly motivated by the other. As for organizational success versus 
socially important work, I imagine that socially important work is a 
strong motivator in organizations whose mission is the accomplish-
ment of some socially important goal. Indeed, the notion that a sub-
set of organizations are “social purpose” organizations is quite con-
sistent with socially important work getting low average scores but 
being characterized as “most powerful” or “descriptive” in a fraction 
of the organizations. Now, if your organization is built to achieve 
some social purpose, achieving that purpose and having your organi-
zation succeed are naturally confounded. Put it this way: if “success 
of the organization” had instead been worded as “fi nancial viability” 
or “fi nancial success” of the organization, the confounding would be 
less, and I’d expect those strong positive correlations to be smaller. 
And to get back to your question about the cross-correlations in Panel 
A, what we’re seeing here is a consequence of what I just described.
 So we agree that different organizations employ different motiva-
tional channels, and we agree that whichever channel is powerful 
for one employee in a given organization is relatively more likely 
to be more powerful for other employees in the same organization. 
You explain the last part by screening. I think it is something more— 
namely, the impact an organizational environment will have on the 
preferences of its employees. We also agree, I think, that different 
motivational channels are better or worse suited to specifi c jobs or, at 
the organizational level, to the constellation of tasks facing employ-
ees who are (and see themselves as) socially similar.
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E: Uh, that last bit is a bit mysterious to me. What’s this “constellation” 
stuff?
P: I can explain with an analogy. Oliver Williamson’s Economizing 
Principle, in his theory of transaction-cost economics, says that a 
transaction will tend to be structured in whatever manner maxi-
mizes the benefi ts it creates, net of its transaction costs.28 William-
son’s focus is on different aspects of those transaction costs, which 
is fi ne. But his unit of analysis is the individual transaction. So if, 
say, Firm F is engaged in separate long-term transactions with Firms 
G1 and G2, we should (the principle says) look separately at the 
two transactions, trying to discern what structure is optimal for each 
one. But insofar as we think that G1 makes inferences about how F 
behaves and will behave in the future based on what G1 sees happen-
ing between F and G2 and vice versa, then that cognitive or infor-
mational link may mean that the structure of the F-G2 transaction 
should take into account the “externalities” it imposes on the costs 
and benefi ts of the F-G1 transaction.
 For the same basic reason, how Firm X motivates Employee A1—
and, more generally, how X treats A1 in all aspects of their rela-
tionship—can have an impact on the perceptions, assessments, 
and behavior of Employee A2, the more so to the extent that A2 
is socially similar to A1. The attribution-theory extension of self-
perception mentioned in conjunction with the story about Company 
Z is one example of this at work, but this is part and parcel of the 
full theory of social comparisons. And, turning this a bit on its head, 
suppose Firm X has two categories of employees: A1, A2, and so on 
are all engineers, while B1, B2, and so forth are clerical assistants. 
This sort of consideration will (probably) lead X to rely on the same 
motivational channels for all the A’s. But X may be able to get away 
with a different sort of motivation altogether for the B’s. So, when 
asking “Which motivational channel or method is best for motivat-
ing Employee A1?,” you probably need to think at the level of the 
characteristics of the jobs of all the Type A employees.
E: Hmmm. And since you posed the question, which motivational 
channel do you see as best for, say, engineers or other categories of 
employees in Type-K jobs? Incentive theory tells me when rewards-
for-performance will work well—see for instance Lazear (2000)—
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and it also tells me that it will be problematic for more complex, 
Type-K jobs. But the survey introduces three alternatives, and I’m 
sure there are more. Why and when would an organization choose 
interesting work instead of organizational success or social mission? 
If you think that through self-perception processes employees can be 
molded into whatever preferences the organization wishes [P shakes 
her head]—okay, I see that you don’t believe that, quite—what 
makes one of those more or less fi t? After all, that’s the question 
posed at the start of this chapter.
P: I don’t have a complete answer to that question, and I don’t think 
you do, either. But SPEC gives us some alluring hypotheses. For 
one thing, the SPEC researchers looked at correlations between the 
fi rm’s strategic objectives and the founder’s HRM vision and, while 
the data set wasn’t large enough to draw robust conclusions, they 
found that fi rms whose strategic plan was to be the low-cost producer 
of a more or less established product were much more likely in the 
sample to choose Bureaucracy. Firms that aimed at wide-open tech-
nological innovation—creating a novel product that met a “need” 
as yet unrecognized by the intended clientele—were very much the 
most likely to be Star-model organizations. And their data on fi nan-
cial performance give some clues: All fi ve models were basically fi t 
(in the situations in which they were chosen) in terms of fi nancial 
outcomes; none dominated any other. But the Commitment model 
had a slight edge, on average and overall, and the Star model was 
best if you looked only at the subsample of fi rms that made it to the 
IPO. Here’s a hypothesized explanation for this: Since, in these sorts 
of start-ups, key employees’ jobs are likely to have a lot of Type-K 
to them, the silver bullet of motivating by “love” of the organization 
might have a slight edge, if you can make it work. But in the culture 
of Silicon Valley, with its very high rate of labor mobility, this might 
be a hard sell. Being motivated by challenging and exciting work 
probably comes more naturally to more of the young engineers and 
technology types that make up a large part of the key workforce 
at high-tech start-ups. But we all know stories of engineers whose 
drive for technological perfection gets in the way of the fi nancial 
success of the organization; remember Voltaire’s adage, “Better is 
the enemy of good.”29 Star-type fi rms, where attachment or motiva-
tion through work is allied to professional and not organizational 
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norms, are at risk of having employees pursuing perfection when 
“good enough” is what they need for economic success. By look-
ing only at the Star-type fi rms that reach the stage of an IPO, you 
are probably censoring out a lot of technological wins but economic 
failures; you are looking at cases where technological wins meant 
at least a measure of economic success—hence this subsample does 
best of all. So: Commitment is best overall, if you can pull it off. But 
censor out the cases of motivation-through-work that go off the rails, 
and you have a conditional winner.
E: Okay, I can see how to build an economic model of that sort. But let’s 
wrap up. What separates our views on the data?
P: We agree on a lot, but we disagree on one potentially important 
point. I think an individual employee’s sources of motivation will 
be affected—I might even say manipulated to some perhaps limited 
extent—by the organizational environment in which she fi nds her-
self. You seem to resist this; instead, you invoke screening to explain 
the connection between what motivates an employee and the type of 
organization in which she is found.
 So I ask, how do you explain what happened at Firm Z? Employees 
previously motivated by the mission soured on this because of inter-
actions they had with the sales force. Have you got a story for that?
E: I do indeed. I’ll explain their initial strong motivation by a desire to 
achieve the goal of changing Industry I and their belief that top man-
agement at Firm Z shared in that goal. When the salespersons were 
hired and compensated, the rest of the professional staff learned 
to their dismay that top management at Firm Z had been playing 
them—top management just wanted to make a lot of money. This 
did change their motivation, but through a shift in their beliefs, not a 
change in their tastes.
 You would no doubt attribute changes in behavior associated with 
what you call the undermining effect to changes in tastes caused by 
a change in self-perception. [P nods in agreement.] Let me tell you 
how an economist views this. The basic story is this: Person Y (he) 
has been doing a task, and doing it well, for little to no fi nancial 
reward. His boss, X (she), offers him some fi nancial compensation if 
he will continue. And this causes him to stop or, at least, to do a more 
slipshod job.
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 Two economists, Bénabou and Tirole, provide two explanations for 
such behavior. In the fi rst of these (Bénabou and Tirole 2003), the 
story is that X knows how hard the job is, and Y infers from the offer 
of fi nancial compensation that, at least this time, the job is going to 
be a lot harder. Not wanting to kill himself, especially if the fi nancial 
compensation is small, he decides not to do it. And in the second 
story (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), Y has been doing the job to con-
vince X and others that he likes this sort of work for its own sake. 
When X offers him some fi nancial compensation, doing the job is no 
longer a clear signal that Y is that sort of person—in the language of 
game theory, X’s offer has jammed the signal that Y was sending—
so it is no longer worthwhile for Y to do the job.
 Now, these are simplifi ed caricatures of the two papers—you’ll need 
to read them to see the details—but in each case, what you explain by 
changing tastes is easily explained by strategic behavior and rational 
inferences, with a completely stable set of preferences.
P: Wow! Those are some pretty clever explanations. I might say to you 
that I fi nd them a wee bit incredible, at least in the context in which 
the undermining effect was fi rst discussed in the literature: the con-
text there was nursery school children drawing detailed pictures, 
seemingly for the fun of it, whose motivation was undermined with 
the offer of cookies.30
 But let me describe to you one other experiment that, it seems to me, 
can only be explained as a shift in tastes. This doesn’t concern moti-
vation in a work setting, but it does seem to me to pose a challenge 
to anyone who believes in utterly stable preferences, tastes, or utility. 
The experiment is described in Liu and Aaker (2008). Subjects were 
told about a particular charity, then asked how likely it was that they 
would donate some of their time to work for the charity and how 
likely it was that they would donate money. Finally, they were given 
the opportunity to make a fi nancial donation. (I’m simplifying a bit; 
read the paper!) There were two treatments: In one treatment, they 
were asked “How likely is it that you’d donate time to the charity?” 
and then “How likely is it that you’d donate money?” In the second 
treatment, the money-ask came fi rst, then the time-ask. The depen-
dent variable was the amount of money actually given, and Liu and 
Aaker fi nd that in the time-ask-fi rst treatment, subjects gave more on 
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average than in the money-ask-fi rst treatment—statistically signifi -
cantly more.31 They explain this by saying that the question asked 
fi rst creates a state of mind in the subject—it primes or frames the 
behavior that is later observed—and they explain why a time-ask-
fi rst primes the subjects to give more, when it comes time to give.
 And I would observe that this phenomenon is not only some mani-
festation of a psych lab experiment. University development (fund-
raising) departments are well aware that fi nancial donations from 
alumni increase if and when the alums are fi rst induced to give some 
of their time to their alma mater. For instance, the Stanford Gradu-
ate School of Business has alumni conduct interviews of prospec-
tive students. The information gathered in these interviews is not 
of zero value; only candidates with a high likelihood of admission 
are interviewed, and a really bad interview can turn acceptance into 
rejection. But for the most part, the admissions offi ce does this as a 
favor to the development people.
 Getting back to Liu and Aaker, maybe you can tell a story about 
how the fi rst question asked provides some sort of information to 
the subjects, and how that changes their beliefs in a way that, in the 
fi rst treatment, makes them conclude the charity is more worthwhile. 
Or something. But it seems to me that if both questions are asked—
and both are asked—telling an information-inference-based story is 
going to be diffi cult. Preferences change. They can be manipulated, 
to some extent. And, in terms of what motivates consummate effort, 
this is probably a signifi cant effect.
BUT IS IT ECONOMICS?
Since I gave her most of the good lines and allowed her the fi nal 
word,32 I doubt that anyone will be surprised to learn that my sympa-
thies in this discussion are with my imaginary psychologist. This isn’t 
to say that the economist is incapable of explaining the data in the SEP 
survey with orthodox economic models. At the least, orthodox econom-
ics can do a good job with those data, if one permits employees to value 
interesting problems, to internalize the welfare of the team or organiza-
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tion to which they belong, or to devote effort to improving the social 
weal. And while utility functions that have these sorts of things as argu-
ments with positive partial derivatives are not exactly rampant in the 
literature, there is nothing unorthodox about them.
Indeed, I believe that a nice orthodox principal-agent model can be 
devised along these lines:  Have a (possibly diverse) set of agents, all of 
whom are powerfully affected by their take-home pay, but all of whom 
also attach some weight to success of the organization. Give them Type-
K jobs, with (say) multiple tasks, some of which can be judged in terms 
of outcomes only after a lot of time has passed or with a lot of noise.  In 
these circumstances, the principal may well opt to avoid pay for perfor-
mance, out of fear of getting it wrong, and let the agents’ (even slight) 
desire to see their organization succeed provide motivation, as long as 
that desire is suffi cient to overcome any “disutility of effort” on the part 
of the employee.33
But once we abandon the notion that each employee comes with 
time-consistent, present-at-birth preferences, we are (as far as I can 
judge) fi rmly doing unorthodox (heterodox?) economics. Mainstream 
economists have—for the most part—resisted enlisting models with 
changing tastes, preferring to explain phenomena while eschewing this 
modeling device. Witness, for instance, the characteristically ingenious 
pair of papers by Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006) that the fi ctitious 
economist cited.
“For the most part” does not mean “entirely,” of course. Work of 
this general sort makes up a fair bit of so-called behavioral economics, 
dealing with time inconsistency that manifests itself as hyperbolic dis-
counting. And Akerlof and Kranton have published papers and even a 
book (Akerlof and Kranton 2010) on what they call identity economics, 
which breaks the taboo against models with changing tastes.34 But one 
might characterize such efforts as isolated brush fi res in the vast for-
est of economic models, rather than as an increasingly encompassing 
confl agration.
A classic paper by Stigler and Becker (1977) makes the argument 
for the orthodox position. As a matter of mathematical fact, one can 
pose dynamic choice behavior that cannot be accommodated with a 
model of unchanging individual preferences; this concerns behavior in 
which the decision maker chooses to put constraints on the choices he 
will have available later, with no compensating improvement (and even 
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with a corresponding decrement) in what he consumes today.35 But, Sti-
gler and Becker argue, empirically important phenomena do not require 
this sort of modeling innovation. And, at least implicitly, they make the 
value judgment that this modeling innovation should be avoided if it 
can be.
I think the last step in this argument—the value judgment—is defec-
tive. The standard argument for modeling agents as utility-maximizing 
is an “as-if” argument: if the choice behavior of an agent satisfi es cer-
tain properties, her choices are as if she is maximizing some utility 
function that maps her options into real numbers. Most microeconomic 
textbooks, at least at the graduate level, start with this result; see, for 
instance, Kreps (2013, Chapter 1). The required properties, though, are 
posed in the context of choice from opportunity sets (drawn from some 
larger set of all possible choices that might be made) at a single point 
in time. Talk of “unchanging preferences” concerns dynamic choice 
behavior, and while additional properties can be found that knit together 
choices made at different points in time and that then guarantee that 
dynamic choices are as if the agent had unchanging preferences,36 those 
additional properties are even less reasonable empirically than the prop-
erties that give utility maximization as an as-if model for static choice.
Even if economists can devise clever models with unchanging pref-
erences that account for some of the phenomena described in this chap-
ter,37 the models we employ to explore important empirical phenomena 
should be as simple and straightforward as we can make them, while 
being consistent with the phenomena. If the subject is motivating con-
summate effort in work settings, I believe the psychologist, backed up 
by her literature, makes a case for changing preferences that is very 
hard to dismiss. Economists should, instead, embrace these ideas.
Notes
I am very grateful to Jennifer Aaker, Jim Baron, Frank Flynn, Deb Gruenfeld, Wendy 
Liu, and Dale Miller for their assistance in helping me understand social psychologi-
cal approaches to motivation and related topics. Of course, any errors in translation 
or transcription that appear in this chapter are entirely my fault. This chapter has 
evolved from discussions I’ve had over the years with Bengt Holmstrom; additional 
valuable comments (from economist colleagues) have been made by Bob Gibbons, 
Jean Kimmel, and Paul Oyer. Versions of it were presented as the Karl Borch Lec-
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ture for 2013 and at a conference honoring Richard Cyert and James March’s classic 
book, A Behavioral Model of the Firm; comments from participants at both presenta-
tions, as well as the fi nancial support of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
are gratefully acknowledged.
It will be obvious that this chapter does not stem from a research paper in the usual 
sense of the word, but instead from an essay intended to raise issues (and contro-
versy) among economists. Given its purpose, I am more than usually interested in 
hearing from readers; my e-mail address is kreps@stanford.edu.
 1.  Some of these characteristics, such as ambiguity, preclude any modeling with 
mainstream techniques at all. 
 2.  And, for just the reason that it is hard to get pay-for-performance right in Type-
K jobs, it would take a lot of data, a lot of time, or both, to come to reliable 
conclusions.
 3.  I lead sessions that begin with the economics of relationships (reciprocity, rep-
utation, and credibility; transaction costs; and vertical strategic partnerships) 
and then go on to motivation on the job.
 4.  For the summer of 2014, the six-week program, including room, board, and 
instruction, cost $61,500 per participant.
 5.  Using the fi ve-point numerical scale, a paired-sample test of difference in 
means between “how effective is X in motivating my direct reports” and 
“ . . . in motivating me” gives a one-sided critical probability of 2 × 10−8 for X = 
“Success of organization” and 1.97 × 10−10 for X = “Work is socially important.” 
For “Exciting work,” the difference in means is still quite signifi cant, with a one-
tailed critical probability of 0.0065.
 6.  For a stark example of this phenomenon, see Heath (1999). In a different part 
of this survey, I replicate the Heath results with SEP participants and have done 
so every year for the past 12; along these lines, it is surely one of the easier-to-
replicate empirical results about motivation.
 7. The numbers of respondents in each category in these two tables differ, and they 
differ from the numbers in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. This happens because the tables 
were created at different points of time; tables created at a later time have more 
respondents. This, however, has no material impact on the qualitative results.
   Without claiming that any of the following are “established,” and recognizing 
the possibility of data mining in this sort of exercise, the data in Table A2 that are 
consistent with things I’ve seen in years past and that I would conjecture might be 
stable results are as follows: Europeans perceive themselves as less self-motivated 
by tangible rewards and more by organizational success than do U.S. citizens and 
Canadians, with East Asians in the middle. The U-shape seen in age versus tangi-
ble rewards has recurred; perhaps young participants feel they have time to make 
their fortunes, while older participants on average have made theirs. Or perhaps 
young participants selected to go to SEP feel so certain of their eventual (fi nancial) 
success that they are unmotivated by the marginal bit of incentive pay. General 
managers certainly perceive themselves as more motivated by contributing to the 
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success of their organization than do functional specialists, an effect that largely 
disappears when we look at their perceptions of their direct reports. (Presumably, 
chairs, CEOs, and chief operating offi cers [COOs] regard themselves as general 
managers, with direct reports who are more likely to be functional specialists, 
such as chief fi nancial offi cers [CFOs], chief information offi cers [CIOs], and so 
forth. Hence the observation that general managers see themselves as more moti-
vated by organizational success than do functional specialists is consistent with 
the observation that chairs, CEOs, and COOs see themselves as similarly moti-
vated but to a greater extent than is true for their direct reports.)
   Note that no participants in the fi nancial services industry said that tangible 
rewards were the most descriptive of what motivates their own best work. Perhaps 
this is an example of folks reacting against stereotype: “I’m in fi nancial services, 
so everyone assumes all I want is to make money, so I’ll show them.” If you look 
instead at the respondents from fi nancial services and what they said was most 
descriptive of how to motivate their direct reports, fi ve said tangible rewards, fi ve 
said interesting work, fi ve said organizational success, and two said social impor-
tance. (Of course, these are all very small numbers.)
   Contrast these data with results I got a few years ago when I conducted a sim-
ilar survey of fi rst-year MBA students. I won’t present the MBA data, but among 
the 140 respondents, tangible rewards were perceived by them in two ways: 1) as 
being signifi cantly more powerful, on average, and 2) as being most descriptive 
of what motivated both their organizational peers (instead of direct reports) and 
themselves. The MBA students were asked to supply demographic details on age, 
sex, geography, industry (the one in which they were last employed), and under-
graduate major. And in the cross-tabs, the power of tangible rewards increased 
markedly for two types of students: 1) those from the fi nancial services industry 
and 2) those who had majored as undergraduates in economics. Geography, sex, 
and age showed no marked pattern.
 8.  I surveyed responses of a smaller and more homogenous group of upper-tier man-
agers from a different executive education program; these participants are all con-
nected to the fi nancial services industry and all come from Australia. The group 
was relatively small, n = 38, so there are added reasons to distrust the results. But 
this group conformed to the pattern described in the text in nearly all important 
respects.
 9. It is probably obvious, but I’ll say anyway that these are not alternative theories in 
the sense that if one is true, the others must be false. Different motivational chan-
nels or pathways can happily coexist in specifi c circumstances. (Those circum-
stances may be a factor in determining how powerfully any one of these theories 
applies.) Indeed, from a normative perspective—the perspective of the practicing 
manager—enlisting several of these theories simultaneously to motivate desired 
behavior is good practice. Therefore, one is interested in knowing which of these 
can happily coexist and even reinforce the others, as well ask knowing which of 
these may weaken the impact of the others. See further on for the discussion on the 
undermining effect.
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 10.  An economist colleague, reading this section, objected that this was “just econom-
ics.” The idea that employees take those actions that maximize the chance they 
will get a reward that they value (and even more, the “formal formulation” of an 
objective function that maximizes the probability of getting a reward times the 
“value” of the reward) is, to an economist, simple expected-utility maximization. 
I understand why an economist would observe these things; I’m unsure why an 
economist would object to a psychological theory that has a very close counterpart 
in the dominant economic theory of choice under uncertainty.
 11.  I confess that I’m somewhat unclear on the demotivating impact of inequitable 
rewards on those at the top end of the distribution of ratios. That wasn’t my experi-
ence as associate dean at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
12. The theory of social comparisons is broader than its application to equity theory. It 
holds that, when person X tries to evaluate how well she is doing and how well she 
is being treated, she will look at her performance and treatment relative to others 
and, in particular, to others who are socially similar to herself.
 13.  Recent work by Grant et al. (2007) adds a fourth item to this list: her perceived 
purpose, a sense that the task achieves something important and valued.
 14.  I am told by colleagues who are psychologists that this paragraph doesn’t quite 
capture self-perception theory; it sounds more like dissonance theory. I gather 
that my use of the term justifi cation is key; according to dissonance theory, when 
X works hard at some task, and when X is unable to perceive a clear purpose for 
doing so, X is affl icted with psychological disequilibrium. To resolve or mitigate 
this unhappy state, X looks for (and fi nds) justifi cation for her actions: “I did it 
because . . . ,” and then whatever fi lls in the blank becomes part of X’s self-image. 
In self-perception theory, in contrast, X is simply and naturally curious about what 
motivated her actions. The young engineers at Data General look at their efforts 
and those of their peers, see that these cannot be due to the promise of tangible 
fi nancial rewards if they succeed, nor to a desire to see Data General succeed, and 
so are left with, “We are doing this because it is fun.” And, then, they regard the 
activity as fun. The two theories give the same observed behavior (it seems to me); 
hence this is an excellent example of what Dale Miller (quoted at the top of p. 108) 
calls the psychologist’s effort to see two things that seem the same as different; in 
fact, I’m told that when Bem fi rst advanced self-perception theory, something of 
an intellectual spitting contest with dissonance theorists was the immediate result.
 15. For details, see Friedman and Deinard (1991a,b), Koloroutis (2004), and Vitello 
(2011). The last is the New York Times obituary of Joyce Clifford, who was head 
nurse at Beth Israel when primary nursing was introduced.
 16.  Well, it used to be, in the 1970s. Changes in how hospitals are compensated for 
patient care have pushed nursing somewhat in the direction of an assembly-line 
job. Keep reading.
 17.  See Harvard Business Review’s case study Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Cen-
ter: Coordinating Patient Care (Gittell, Wimbush, and Shu 1999).
18.  Readers well versed in the literature may know of a work by Bénabou and Tirole 
that provides orthodox-economics explanations for this empirical phenomenon. I 
will discuss their work later in this chapter.
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 19.  As long as X ≠ Y, an economist could regard attribution theory as a straightfor-
ward (Bayesian or otherwise) inference by X about Y’s preferences and desires. It 
is when X = Y, when X attributes her own motives ex post to why she took some 
action, and then is infl uenced in future behavior by the attribution on which she 
settles, that an orthodox economist becomes squeamish at least.
 20.  Just more (Bayesian) inference—in this case about what motivates Y and people 
like him.
 21.  This is a real-life story. I have tried to persuade the real-life company to let me 
write a case about it, but for reasons that will become apparent, they do not want 
this story told. So I must be careful not to identify the company and will resort to 
calling them Company Z in Industry I.
 22.  Links to the output of SPEC can be found at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/ces/
research/specproject.html.
 23.  Another 28 percent of the fi rms were what the researchers called a “hybrid engi-
neering” model, a model that varied from the engineering model in only one 
dimension. There are seven hybrid-engineering models, one of which is Bureau-
cracy. Of the 36 possible models, eight differ from each of the fi ve pure types 
along two dimensions, and of the 154 fi rms in the sample, only two were one of 
these eight anomalous models.
 24.  On multitasking, the classic reference is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
 25. I’m not going to build formal models of any of this, but on this point I should note 
that if early-career employees understand that the organization screens for this 
characteristic in deciding whom to promote, the incentive to act early on “as if” 
the organization matters to the individual is increased. This will be good for the 
organization with respect to early-career employees, but it will make it more dif-
fi cult to do the desired screening. Load on top of this a tournament model for who 
is promoted, and you have an interesting model to explore.
 26. And, to follow up on the previous note, as prospective MBA students, they pre-
sumably have less interest in taking actions that make it appear “as if” they have 
the organization’s best interests at heart, since they will probably leave the organi-
zation before such behavior would bear fruit.
 27. To add a technical point here: Credibility of the commitment—Condition C—is 
usually explained by economists as arising from the employer’s desire to maintain 
a reputation for behaving in a certain way. But the analysis of reputations—at 
least, the game-theoretic analysis of reputations—makes clear that the hinge on 
which a reputation hangs is whether interested third parties can tell when, in this 
context, the employer fails to live up to his reputation. For this to work, then, it 
isn’t enough that the employee and employer meet Conditions A and B; third par-
ties must meet these conditions as well, and have an understanding of what is “the 
right thing to have done.”
 28. See, for example, Williamson (1996).
 29. The English variant of Voltaire’s saying is “Perfect is the enemy of good.”
 30. Or consider the following completely hypothetical thought experiment. Suppose 
hospitals began to offer cash rewards for the donation from the dead of usable 
organs—so much for eyes, etc.—with the cash paid to the deceased’s estate. 
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Would this increase the number of people who indicate (say, on their driver’s 
licenses) that they are willing organ donors? Notwithstanding the bequest motive, 
which is well-established mainstream economics, I suspect not, at least among 
the relatively well-to-do. And it is hard to tell either Bénabou and Tirole story in 
this case, unless one supposes either that the living care to publicize that they are 
potential donors while alive, or that they care about their reputation when dead.
 31. The subjects could donate up to $10. In the time-ask-fi rst treatment, the average 
donation was $5.85, versus $3.07 in the money-ask-fi rst treatment. In a difference-
of-means test, the two-sided critical probability for the hypothesis of equal means 
was p < 0.001. Although not reported in the paper, Liu and Aaker (2008) also 
collected data on the answers to the (somewhat hypothetical) questions about the 
likelihood of donating time and/or money. Letting T1 be the average likelihood 
of volunteering time (on a scale of 1 to 7) in the time-ask-fi rst treatment, letting 
M1 be the average likelihood of volunteering money, and letting T2 and M2 be the 
corresponding means for the money-ask-fi rst treatment, they found T1 = 4.12 > T2 
= 2.94 and M1 = 4.34 > M2 = 3.72. To put this mathematical representation into 
words, in the time-ask-fi rst treatment, the indicated likelihood of giving both time 
and money was higher than the likelihoods in the money-ask-fi rst treatment. The 
difference in means in T1 and T2 has a critical probability < 0.001, while for the 
difference in means between M1 and M2 the critical probability is p = 0.06. In both 
treatments, the indicated willingness to give was positively correlated: in the time-
ask-fi rst treatment, corr(T1, M1) = 0.462; and in the money-ask-fi rst treatment, 
corr(T2, M2) = 0.459 (Wendy Liu, associate professor of marketing, University of 
California San Diego, in discussion with the author, 2014).
 32. Since beauty is in the eye of the beholder, I add here that a psychologist colleague 
who read an early draft of this chapter was concerned that the representative of his 
tribe, P, comes off as “something of a twit.” I don’t see it, but, after all, de gustibus 
. . . .
 33. If papers along these lines have been written, I am unaware of them, and I would 
be grateful if readers would direct me to them.
 34. In fact, even Gary Becker sometimes built models in which preferences are 
manipulable, albeit the manipulable preferences are those of children (Becker, 
Murphy, and Spenkuch 2014). I say “even Gary Becker” here because of Stigler 
and Becker (1977), to be discussed momentarily.
 35. Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 76) seem to recognize this when they write, “[No 
need for models of changing tastes] is a thesis that does not permit of direct proof 
because it is an assertion about the world, not a proposition in logic.”
 36. See, for instance, Kreps (2013), Section 7.3 and, in particular, Proposition 7.1.
 37. And I’m hard-pressed to see how even a very clever economist could explain 
away Liu and Aaker (2008).
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